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The Myth of Domain-Independent Persistence 
Jay C. Webert 
Abstract 
The frame problem can be reduced to the problem of inferring the 
non-existence of causes for change. This paper concerns how these 
non-existence inferences are made, and shows how many popular 
approaches lack generality because they rely on a domain-indepen-
dent assumption of occurrence omniscience. Also, this paper shows 
how to represent and use appropriate domain-dependent knowled-
ge in three successively more expressive versions, where the causal 
theories are deductive, non-monotonic, and statistical. 
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1. Introduction 
A property can be reasoned to persist over time by reasoning that every 
action that could cause it to change did not occur. This reduction is the first 
step of many solutions to the frame problem, including: 
Cause-closure axioms [Haas 1987, Schubert 1989]. This approach supplies 
a disjunction of possible actions that could cause a property to change. 
For example, using the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes 1969], 
e.g. where the predicate holds relates properties to world situations, and 
the function do applies an action to a situation to produce a new situa-
tion, the following axiom states that if a gun becomes not loaded, then it 
must have been unloaded or shot: 
'Vcr,a[(holds(ioaded,cr) 1\ ..,holds(loaded,do(a,cr» ) ~ (a=unload v a=shoot)] . 
When combined with a unique names assumption, these axioms are 
powerful enough to derive the standard frame axioms, e.g. given that 
"(wait 1:- unload) A (wait 1:- shoot)", then " \I cr [holds(loaded,cr) ~ holds(loaded,do(wait,cr»)" is a theo-
rem. However, cause-closure axioms do not suffer from the historical 
combinatorial argument against frame axioms, since there is only one 
axiom per property. 
Minimizing potential causes [Lifschitz 1987, Haugh 1987]. This approach 
generates the above cause-closure axioms indirectly. Causal connections 
between actions and properties are represented using the predicate 
causes, e.g. 
causes(unload,not(loaded» 1\ causes(shoot,not(loaded» , 
and are related to property change by the following Law of Inertia: 
'Vn:,cr,a[(holds(n:,cr) 1\ ..,holds(n:,do(a,cr») ~ causes(a,not(n:»] . 
When causes is minimized (Le. circumscribed [McCarthy 1980]), cause-
closure axioms like the one above become theorems (Lifschitz [1987]). 
This implicit derivation has the advantage of "automatically" modifying 
the cause-closure axioms when new causal information is added. 
Explicit occurrence [Georgeff 1986, Morgenstern and Stein 1988, Sande-
wall 1988, Weber 1988]. These approaches relate properties to times 
using the predicate true l , and relate events to times with the predicate 
occurs. Event occurrence at time 't only partially constrains the proper-
IThe predicate holds is often used to relate properties to times [Allen 1984, Georgeff 1986, Weber 1988], although in 
order to avoid confusion this paper reserves that predicate for relating properties to situations. 
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ties over 't' (the successor of t in a discrete time line). as opposed to 
situation calculus actions that completely determine the resulting situa-
tion. making explicit occurrence cause-closure axioms slightly different. 
e.g. 
'v''t[(true(loaded;t) 1\ ..,true(loaded,'t')) -7 (occurs(Unload,'t) v occurs(Shoot,'t))] , 
These axioms are given explicitly [Georgeff 1986. Morgenstern and 
Stein 1988] or derived non-monotonically [Sandewall 1988. Weber 
1988] in a manner similar to minimizing potential causes. Note that the 
above event constants are capitalized words; this is to distinguish them 
from situation calculus actions. which have a much different meaning. 
The remaining technical difficulty is how to make appropriate inferences 
about the occurrence of actions (or events). The traditional approach. which 
this paper disputes. is that non-occurrences are inferred even when parti-
cular information relevant to those occurrences is lacking. For example, the 
intuition behind the ubiquitous "shooting" scenario [Hanks and McDermott 
1986] says that the reasoner should infer that no unload action occurs , and 
therefore the loaded gun stays loaded . However, axiomatic speCifications of 
the shooting scenario [Hanks and McDermott 1986, Lifschitz 1987, Morgen-
stern and Stein 1988, etc.] contain neither knowledge about how guns 
become unloaded. nor contextual knowledge needed to evaluate whether an 
unload action actually occurred. Ironically, any approach that resolves the 
in-herent ambiguity must be unsound and even unreliable, since it substi-
tutes a domain-independent mechanism for the relevant domain-dependent 
knowledge. 
Section two exposes the hidden assumptions that allow many approaches 
to solve the frame problem despite the lack of the necessary domain-depen-
dent details. Section 2 .1 shows that approaches to causal reasoning based on 
the situation calculus trivialize the inference of non-occurrences because of 
their treatment of action , which implicitly contains an unrealistic assump-
tion that the reasoner is omniscient with respect to occurrences. Section 
2.2 shows that a similar criticism applies to several recent explicit occur-
rence approaches because of their minimization of the predicate occurs, 
which embodies a similar assumption about occurrence omniscience. 
As an alternative approach. Section three suggests how to make inferences 
about non-occurrence using reasonable domain-dependent knowledge, ra-
ther than an omniscience assumption. Section 3.1 presents a purely deduc-
tive approach that disproves necessary preconditions of events, which is 
powerful enough to solve th e "Yale Shooting Problem". Section 3.2 gene-
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ralizes the deductive approach to use non-monotonicity in a domain-depen-
dent manner, which is powerful enough to solve the "parked car" problem. 
Finally, Section 3.3 presents a statistical approach, which provides a justifi-
cation for non-monotonic assumptions, as well as a more expressive way of 
reasoning about belief in properties and occurrences. 
2. Domain-Independent Approaches 
Hanks and McDermott [1986] show that McCarthy's [1984] non-monotonic , 
approach to the frame problem exhibits an unintuitive temporal ambiguity, 
demonstrated by the shooting scenario. The standard exposition involves an 
agent who loads a gun, waits momentarily, and then fires the gun at a poten-
tial victim "Fred". The challenge of this scenario is to supply a domain-
independent mechanism which produces the intuitive conclusion that the 
gun stays loaded during the wait, and therefore Fred dies (this paper 
concentrates on the key inference that the loadedness of the gun perSists, 
thereby ignoring the actual loading of the gun. and morbid inferences about 
poor Fred). 
This problem has inspired a great deal of discussion. The first solutions 
use elaborate non-monotonic constructions [Shoham 1986, Kautz 1986, 
Lifschitz 1986], but have been seriously questioned [Haugh 1987, Goodwin 
1987] on the grounds that they produce unintuitive results in some sce-
narios. The next wave of solutions [Lifschitz 1987, Haugh 1987] use non-
monotonicity differently (to complete the causal theory rather than the con-
text), but have been criticized for their functional view· of action [Morgen-
stern and Stein 1988, Weber 1988]; this criticism is refined and extended 
in Section 2.1. Recent solutions allow for a more natural specification of 
occurrences [Morgenstern and Stein 1988, Sandewall 1988, Weber 1988], 
but as shown in Section 2.2, they employ an unnatural minimization of 
occurrences that leads to problematic inferences. 
This state of technical confUSion is largely due to the traditional but 
misguided mandate for a domain-independent mechanism to solve the frame 
problem. The next two sections discuss how the rationality of several popu-
lar solutions to the frame problem suffer from their emphasis on domain-
independent mechanisms. 
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2.1 Implicit Occurrence Omniscience 
Approaches that are based on the functional view of action implicitly make 
the often unreasonable assumption that the reasoner is omniscient with 
regard to the occurrence of actions. These approaches include the situation 
calculus [McCarthy and Hayes 1969], many deductive or algorithmic planners 
[Fikes and Nilsson 1971, etc.], and many recent logical frameworks [Lifschitz 
1987, Ginsberg and Smith 1987. Haugh 1987]. They all assume that the 
reasoner knows (or is told) exactly what has occurred, trivializing the 
inference of non -occurrences and therefore the frame problem. 
As Georgeff [1986] pOints out, this assumption arises because an action is a 
(reified) function that maps situations into situations. To prove that some 
action b did not occur between situation s and situation data,s), the reasoner 
need only prove a~b. This allows the bizarre inference that any action can be 
prevented simply by doing something else, i.e. the sun will not set so long as 
Joshua holds his hands in the air. 2 Despite claims to the contrary 
[Morgenstern and Stein 1988, Weber 1988], this problem is not an inherent 
inability to represent Simultaneously occurring actions. In fact, it is simple 
to use a composition operator on actions; e.g. comp(a,b) produces a new action 
which is the simultaneous performance of a and b. Of course, this new action 
object must be included in the axioms relating property change and action 
application (this description can be made simpler by encoding the 
interactions between a and b). However, even when composite actions are 
applied to situations, the component actions are necessarily the only actions 
that contribute to the content of the resulting situation. Therefore, when a 
reasoner applies a ground action term (constant or composite) to a situation, 
the reasoner claims it knows exactly what occurred. There seem to be few 
or no domains of interests where this claim of omniscience is justified. 
It should be noted that this omniscience assumption is not inherent in the 
Situation calculus, but rather how it is invariably used. The assumption is 
removed if instead of applying ground actions to situations, the reasoner 
applies constrained action variables. A constrained variable does not neces-
sarily completely determine the resulting Situation, so the omniscience 
assumption is no longer implicit. Simultaneous events are represented by 
conjoining constraints. In fact, the use of constrained variables in situation 
calculus is expressively equivalent to a discrete time line with atomic events 
[Weber 1989c]. 
However, removing the omniscience assumption has removed the powerful 
2The relevance of lhis biblical reference was discovered by Josh Tenenbcrg (personal communicalion). 
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(albeit inappropriate) mechanism for inferring action non-occurrences, 
making the frame problem a problem once again. Because of their instrinsic 
similarity, this is also true of approaches based on time lines and events 
[Georgeff 1986, McDermott 1982, Morgenstern and Stein 1988, Weber 
1988, and in a real sense Allen 1984]. To solve the frame problem, some 
additional mechanism must be added to infer non-occurrences. The next 
section examines the popular technique of minimizing the predicate occurs, 
and shows that like situation calculus solutions, it also imposes an inappro-
priate assumption of occurrence omniscience. 
2.2 Explicit Occurrence Omniscience 
McDermott [1982] reluctantly suggested that a non-monotonic implemen-
tation of the sleeping dog strategy, or "things tend to stay the same", should 
be added to causal representations based on an explicit time line. A recent 
adaptation of this suggestion has been to interpret the sleeping dog strategy 
as "events tend to not occur" and use cause-closure axioms to extend this to 
properties. This domain-independent assumption about non-occurrence has 
been implemented by minimizing the predicate occurs, i.e. (modulo multiple 
minimal models) if it is not known that an event occurs then it is known that 
it does not occur [Sandewall 1988, Weber 1988]. This approach produces 
the intuitive reading of the shooting scenario, via the default inference that 
neither an unload nor a shoot event occurs while the reasoner waits, and 
therefore by cause-closure, the gun remains loaded. 
The approach of Morgenstern and Stein [1988] is similar but with a weaker 
minimization. They minimize only unmotivated occurrences, where an 
occurrence is motivated when it appears in the consequent of a causal rule 
whose antecedent is at least partially known. More precisely, a possible 
element (e,l) of occurs is exempt from minimization if and only if in the 
axiomatic theory there exists a rule "(ex /\ ~) ~ Occurs(e,t)", where a is provable. 
This definition is both semantic and syntactic. requiring special care when 
constructing axiomatic theories in order to avoid undeSirable results. 
Nevertheless, it also produces the intuitive reading of the shooting scenario 
because neither unload nor shoot events are motivated. 
Minimization of occurrences, however, imposes an assumption of 
omniscience similar to the one we found objectionable for situation calculus. 
Whatever events the reasoner cannot prove (or motivate) occur are assumed 
to not occur by the minimization; this claims that the reasoner knows 
exactly what occurs at all times. The reasoner should not be able to 
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conclude that an arbitrary gun remains loaded, especially if the gun is in 
another room, or another country. Valid inferences about occurrences 
require domain-dependent information about the possibility, feasibility, or 
probability of particular events at particular times. The next section pursues 
this domain-dependent paradigm. 
3. Domain-Dependent Approaches 
The approaches described in the last section were influenced by the 
traditional conjecture that the frame problem should be solved by some 
domain-independent mechanism. This stance dates back to the dismissal of 
frame axioms on combinatorial grounds [McCarthy and Hayes 1969], and 
seems to be one of the few pOints of agreement in the causal reasoning 
literature. 
Nevertheless, this section breaks with this tradition by presenting three 
novel domain-dependent solutions to the frame problem. The first solution 
demonstrates that some intuitive inferences, in particular the outcome of 
the shooting scenario, can be derived through the careful specification of a 
deductive theory. The second version demonstrates how to use non-mono-
toniCity for more flexible inference, without exhibiting the problems the 
previous section described. Finally, the third version shows how the non-
monotonic mechanism can be generalized to make inferences about probabi-
lities' based on statistics which capture causal relations. 
3.1 Deductive Domain Details 
As Georgeff [1986] states, "it has been common to use various default rules, 
non-monotonic operators, or minimal models to constrain the set of possible 
event occurrences. However, there are many cases in which this is unne-
cessary - where we can [deductively] prove ... that no events (or effects) of 
interest could possibly occur." This paper advocates the specification of 
necessary preconditions to make these proofs possible. Such axioms specify 
properties that are necessarily true for the event to occur, as opposed to the 
usual interpretation of preconditions as suffiCient conditions for an action to 
imply certain effects [Fikes and Nilsson 1971, McCarthy and Hayes 1969, 
Shoham 1988, Lifschitz 19873 ]. Thus an event can be proven not to occur by 
proving that at least one of its necessary preconditions does not hold. 
3The preconditions of Lifschitz are also necessary for the action to cause any effects; that is, an action with a false 
precondition will map a situation to itself. 
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Thus the reduction from change to occurrence coupled with necessary 
preconditions solves the frame problem. For example, conSider the follo-
wing version of the causal knowledge needed in the shooting scenario: 
a. "A gun will remain loaded unless it is unloaded or shot", i.e. 
'v'y;t[(true(loaded(y),'t)/\ ..,true(loaded(y);t'» ~ :Jro[occurs(Unload(ro,y),'t) v 
occurs(Shoot(ro,y),'t)]] . 
This rule is an explicit occurrence cause-closure axiom, although it . 
contains some notational features not previously discussed: functions 
that produce properties (Ioaded(y) produces the property of the gun y 
being loaded). functions that produce events (Unload(w,y) is the event of 
agent w unloading gun y) and existentially-quantified parameters in the 
consequent, generating a potentially infinite list of possible causes. 
b. "An agent must be grasping a gun to unload or shoot it", i.e. 
'v'ro,y,'t[(occurs(Unload(ro,y) ,'t) v occurs(Shoot(ro,y) ,'t» ~ true(grasping(ro,y),'t)] . 
This rule specifies a necessary precondition for both Unload(w,y) as well as 
Shoot(w,y) events for any wand y. 
c. "At most one agent can grasp a gun at a given time", i.e. 
'v'ro,8,y,'t[(true(grasping(ro,y),'t) /\ true(grasping(8,y) ;t)) ~ ro=8] . 
This rule supplies a domain constraint [Allen and Koomen 1983] which 
will be handy to disprove the necessary precondition in rule "b", i.e. to 
prove that a particular agent is not grasping the object, it suffices to 
prove that a different agent is grasping the object. 
This version of the shooting scenario also needs axioms for details of the 
scenario in question: 
d. "At the onset, the gun is loaded", i.e. "'rue(loaded(gun1),O)". This axiom ap-
pears in all expositions of the shooting scenario, except that in this case 
the property loaded is parameterized by the gun in question. 
e. "At the onset, the reasoning agent grasps the gun", for example, 
"true(grasping(me,gun1),O>". This axiom is not typically included in expositions 
of the shooting scenariO, but it is strongly suggested by it, since the 
agent has just loaded the gun and is about to shoot it. 
f. "The reasoning agent then waits briefly, without unloading or shooting 
the gun.", i.e . 
..,occurs(Unload(me,gun1 ),0)/\ ..,occurs(Shoot(me,gun1 ),0) . 
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The italicized clause has not appeared previously in expositions of the 
shooting scenario, although it seems to follow from the prose descrip-
tion of the problem; whatever "waits" means in the context of gun 
handling, it must certainly imply that the agent does not unload or shoot 
the gun. 
From these six axioms the reasoner may deductively infer that the gun 
persists in being loaded. In the following proof, the reason for a proof-step 
consists of the axiom letters and theorem numbers used to derive it: 
Step Theorem Reason 
1 'v' W[ @!:me ~ -,true(grasping( w,gun1 ),0)] c,e 
2 'v' w[ @!:me ~ (-,occurs(Shoot( w,gun1 ),0) 1\ -,occurs(Unload( w,gun1 ),0))] 1,b 
3 -,::!w[ occurs(Shoot( w,gun1 ),0) v occurs(Unload(w,gun1 ),0)] 2,f 
4 -,(true(loaded(gun1 ),0) 1\ -,true(loaded(gun1 ),0')) 3,a 
5 true(ioaded(gun1), 1) 4,d 
This proof demonstrates that it is possible to deductively derive the intuitive 
outcome of the shooting scenario simply by being explicit about the 
knowledge behind our intuitions. An algorithmic interpretation is straight-
forward: to predict the persistence of a property, the reasoner indexes to all 
events that could change that property, and then investigates the possibility 
of any of those events occurring. Because this algorithm is based on 
deduction , we know it is sound: if the domain knowledge is correct, then so 
are the inferences about persistences. 
3.2 Non-Monotonic Domain Details 
Unfortunately, solving the frame problem is not as easy as the previous 
section suggested. The qualification problem [McCarthy 1977] tells us that, 
in general, it will not be possible to evaluate an exhaustive list of sufficient 
conditions for property change; surely this lesson also applies to sufficient 
conditions for lack of change. It will not always (or even rarely) be possible to 
prove that all potential causes cannot occur, without making some defeaSible 
assumptions. This observation does not contradict the position of this paper 
stated thus far, so long as the non-monotonic rules are domain-dependent 
and context-sensitive. 
An example will help clarify this pOint. Surprisingly, the most convincing 
example we could find of a reasoning Situation that does not require non-
monotonicity was the de facto benchmark of non-monotonic approaches, the 
shooting scenario. Therefore, we turn to another common example, where 
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the agent parks its car, goes to work, and then expects to find its car in the 
same spot at the end of the day [Allen 1984]. Thus the agent has persisted 
the position of its car, despite that it could have been stolen, borrowed, 
impounded, or perhaps the parking brake failed and it rolled downhill. 
None of these actions can typically be proven to not occur, yet the inference 
that the car will remain is typically very reasonable. 
Rather than basing this inference on the general claim that "particular 
events typically don't happen", we suggest basing the inference on reaso-
nable assumptions about the specific events that could move the car. Such . 
assumptions are inherently domain-dependent. For example, it may be rea-
sonable to assume that the car will not be impounded when parked in the 
proper lot, as in the following default rule: 
V't[true(in-Iot,'t) ~ ..,occurs(lmpounded,'t)] , 
where .. ~ .. means "defeasibly implies", The semantics of such an operator 
have been carefully investigated elsewhere [Loui 1987, Nute 1986]; for 
simplicity we will adopt an informal interpretation where a consistent 
consequence is considered true when the antecedent is considered true. 
Thus this rule allows the reasoner to exclude the possibility that the car is 
towed when it is consistent to do so. 
Defeasible assumptions must also be sensitive to the acquisition of new 
relevant evidence. Of course, the nature of defeasible rules provides a weak 
sensitivity to context, namely that when new information indicates that the 
consequence is no longer consistent, it is no longer asserted. However, this 
mechanism does not handle new information that suggests the consequent is 
no longer reasonable; for example, if the car is parked in a fire lane or a 
handicapped space, it may be more appropriate to invoke the following rule: 
V't[(true(in-Iot,'t) /\ true(illegally-parked,'t)) ~ occurs(lmpounded,'t)] , 
which stipulates the opposite conclusion. Along the same lines, if hazard 
flashers allow for temporary parking in an illegal space, the reasoner may 
also have the following rule: 
V't[(true(in-Iot,'t) /\ true(illegally-parked,'t) /\ true(flashing,'t)) ~ ..,occurs(lmpounded,'t)] , 
and so on. These rules show how different contextual knowledge can 
motivate quite different assumptions. This context-sensitivity is only 
possible in a domain-dependent approach to specifying causal knowledge. 
The coexistence of the above rules will lead to a conflict between their 
invocations, requiring that the reasoner has some mechanism to resolve the 
-10 -
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conflict. This is simple for the above rules. because there is a clear intuition 
that the last rule should have priority due to its more specific antecedent 
[Etherington 1987J. When the relationship between rules is not so clear. 
their interactions can be represented explicitly using defeaters [Loui 1987. 
Nute 1986J: defeaters also have the advantage that they support a weaker 
interaction. where an assumption is blocked without having to assume its 
negation. e.g. the reasoner makes no assumption about the car being towed. 
There is an argument for domain-independent causal assumptions that 
should be mentioned here. If a causal scenario is interpreted as a story4. 
then certain communication conventions become involved. In particular. the 
storyteller is expected to supply all details necessary for the reader to 
correctly make the relevant inferences [Grice 1975J. Therefore. if a relevant 
question is unanswered. the reader may assume that the storyteller believes 
that the answer is the most typical one given the story. For example. if the 
standard shooting scenario is a story. then the reader would answer the 
question "was the gun unloaded during the wait?" with "of course not. or I 
would have been told so". These assumptions can be drawn for any story. so 
they are in that sense domain-independent. However. note that the infe-
rence involves the reader ascertaining what value is typically based on the 
supplied details. which is a domain-dependent inference like discussed 
above. Regardless. the encoding of communication conventions should not 
be considered fundamental to causal reasoning. since there are applications 
where these inferences are not generally valid (e.g. in planning. the agent 
may not have sensed some relevant property. and he will not have any 
guarantees that the property's value is typical). 
This domain-dependent non-monotonic approach follows the course that 
Georgeff [1986] suggests when he says: 
... it seems reasonable. at first. to assume that my car is still where I 
left it this morning. unless I have information that is inconsistent 
with that assumption. However. this premise gets less and less rea-
sonable as hours turn into days. weeks. months. years. and centuries 
- even if it is qUite consistent to make such a premise. This puts 
the [frame] problem where it should be - namely. in the area of 
making reasonable assumptions. not in the area of defining the 
effects of actions. the persistency of facts. or causal laws. 
This passage also (perhaps unintentionally) exposes a limitation of the 
41l appears that architects of non-monotonic approaches to causal reasoning often base their intuitions on this 
interpretation, although this is rarely made explicit (an exception being by McCarthy [1986]). 
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approach thus far, since it has no way of capturing the notion "less and less 
reasonable". Indeed, it is even unclear what makes an assumption "reaso-
nable" at all: must it be true in some large percentage of possible worlds, or 
merely more likely than its negation? Must the risks and benefits of adop-
ting the assumption be conSidered? The next section provides an approach 
from which to address these questions, by generalizing causal knowledge 
from non-monotonic to statistical. 
3.3 Statistical Domain Details 
The similarity between non-monotonic and statistical inference has often 
been noted [Loui 1987, Pearl 1988], since they both concern the assignment 
of belief to sentences based on global properties of a body of knowledge. 
This section shows how to employ basic techniques from statistical infe-
rence [Kyburg 1974] to assign numerical beliefs to assertions about the 
persistence of properties. The basic statistical persistence inference is the 
derivation of sentences of the form: 
B(true(p,t') I true(p,t)) = x , 
for particular p, I and x. This equation should be read as "x is the belief that p 
is true immediately after I, given that p is true at t." This sentence is also 
often called an assignment of conditional probability. Under the statistical 
interpretation of probabilistic belief, this sentence can be derived from a 
conditional statistic which generalizes over objects in the domain of 
discourse, e.g. the following: 5 
%rr[true(rr,t') I true(rr,t)] = x , 
which should be read as "x (by convention, from the real interval [0,1]) is the 
proportion of properties true at I which are also true at time I'." Note that 
the symbol % plays a role similar to a quantifier in ordinary logic. Thus, given 
this statistic, and the epistemic conviction that property p is a random 
element [Kyburg 1987] of properties true at time I, then we may use the 
number x as the belief "B(lrue(p,t') I Irue(p,I»". Intuitively, if we know that "very 
little changed today", then some random property is likely to not have 
changed. 
Many causal reasoning inferences are based on a generalization over tem-
poral arguments. For example, "the car almost always stays in the parking 
5The notation (and semantics) for statistics is from Bacchus [1988], except that the variables appear as a prefix 
instead of a subscripted suffix. A simpler set-notation for causal statistics appears elsewhere [Tenenberg and Weber 
1989, Weber 1989a, Weber 1989b], but the current notation is more appropriate for this paper because of its 
similarity to the standard representation of properties and occurrences. 
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lot" is analogous to the statistical assertion: 
%"C[true(in-lot,"C') I true(in-lot,"C)] ~ 1 . 
The generalization over times seems to be very basic to human appreciation 
of causality, as evidenced by common phrases like "almost always" and 
"most of the time". The popular intuition "properties tend to not change" 
can be captured by generalizing over both properties and times, i.e. 
%1t,"C[true(1t,"C') I true(1t,"C)] ~ 1 . 
However, this statistic is only applicable when the properties and times of 
interest are random. This is the essence of the domain-independent/depen-
dent issue in this statistical setting: a reasoner will often have contextual 
information that invalidates the use of the above generalization, making it 
necessary for the reasoner to have and use more specific statistics, just as a 
default reasoner is obliged to use more specific non-monotonic rules when 
more contextual information is conSidered. 
Contextual knowledge is handled by asserting statistics with more specific 
conditions on the right-hand side of the conditional bar. For example, when 
the car is known to be illegally parked, it will be more appropriate to use the 
statistic: 
%"C[true(in-lot,"C') I true(in-lot,"C) /\ true(iliegally-parked,"C)] = .8 , 
which inspires a much different numerical perSistence belief. Thus the 
interactions between the application of different statistics exhibits the "non-
monotonic" behavior necessary for causal reasoning. 
Actions may be causally related to property change in a manner similar to 
cause-closure axioms. The value of " B(true(p,t') I C(P,t»" for some contextual 
knowledge c(p,t) can be related to a list of potential causes al , ... ,an by repeated 
applications of the additivity theorem: 
B(P I Q) = B(P /\ R I Q) + B(P /\ -,R I Q) , 
which produces the following series: 
B(true(p,t') /\ occurs(al,t) I c(p,t» + B(true(p,t') /\-,occurs(al,t) /\ occurs(a2,t) I c(p,t» + .. . + 
B(true(p,t')/\ -,occurs(al ,t)/\ ... /\ -,occurs( an,t) I c(p,t» . 
To simplify this series, assume that the actions al , ... ,an cannot occur pairwise 
simultaneously (by definition), and that the last term is insignificant (which 
assumes that the reasoner knows all significant potential causes). This 
leaves the following series: 
-13-
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Li B(true(p,t') /\ ocCUrS(ai,t) I C(p,t)) . 
This can be simplified further if the actions unconditionally imply the effect 
(by definition6 ), making the first conjunct redundant, thus producing the 
following equality: 
B(true(p,t') I c(p,t)) = Li B(occurs(ai,t) I c(p,t)) . 
This equality justifies the following algorithm: to derive a probabilistic belief 
in a property being true in some context, sum up the beliefs in each possible 
cause, relative to the current context. Note that this applies to either the 
belief in the persistence of p, when c(p ,t) implies true(p ,t), or the change of p, 
when c(p,t) implies ...,true(p,t). Also. remember that the values of these beliefs 
follow from appropriate statistics as described above. 
The derivation of probabilistic beliefs improves on the non-monotonic 
approach in several ways. The notion of becoming "less reasonable" has a 
straightforward interpretation as declining numeric belief. Dean and 
Kanazawa [1988] model the decay of belief in the persistence of a property 
by using survivor junctions, which express belief in a property as an (ex-
ponential) function over elapsed time. Also, the notion of what assumptions 
are reasonable can be defined by an acceptance threshold, or better yet, 
numeric beliefs provide a basic for constructing a decision theory [Chernoff 
and Moses 1959], in order to appreCiate the influences of utility and 
decision. Also, causal statistics provide a more powerful approach to the 
qualification problem [Tenenberg and Weber 1989], and allow for efficient 
numerical approximations based on the examination of statistical impacts 
[Weber 1989b]. 
A full exposition of statistical causal reasoning is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We refer the interested reader to the work of Weber [1989a, 1989b], 
Tenenberg and Weber [1989]' Dean and Kanazawa [1988], Hanks [1988], and 
Pearl [1988] for more details and areas of current research. 
4. Conclusions 
The search for a domain-independent solution to the frame problem has not 
been successful. The optimistic insistence on generating reasonable infe-
rences about perSistence without the requisite causal and contextual 
6This assumption about the definition of actions does not preclude contingent effects. since these actions can be 
contingently generated from other actions. For example. the action "shoot" will always imply that the gun is no 
longer loaded. yet "shoot" is generated from "pull-trigger" only when the gun was loaded. 
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knowledge has produced a series of solutions that contain an unreasonable 
assumption of occurrence omniscience. It is time for the field to concen-
trate on the competence and performance · of representations that capture 
the domain-dependent knowledge that a reasoner can use to derive the 
plausibility of properties persisting. The most promising such approach uses 
statistical assertions to capture causal relationships, employing well-estab-
lished techniques from statistical inference to derive probabilistic beliefs. 
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